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Abstract: Discursive approaches to analyzing politeness often eschew Brown
and Levinson’s theory of politeness as being too dependent on speech act theo-
ry and Gricean pragmatics. However, in this analysis of a courtroom interaction
I will show how some of the concepts from Brown and Levinson’s theory, such
as face-threatening behaviour and positive and negative politeness, can provide
us with a vocabulary with which to talk about dynamic situated interaction.
These are combined with reference to the norms of behaviour in the context of
situation, as well as an appreciation of how meaning is defined as negotiated
by participants as they interact. In the interaction under question here I show
how the meaning of these utterances can be observed in the data themselves
by looking at the sequence and take-up of turns at talk and by commenting on
the relationship between the form of the utterances and the context in which
they are uttered. In this way, some of the most useful concepts from Brown and
Levinson are applied to the data from a constructivist perspective.
Keywords: Brown and Levinson, politeness, face, courtroom, institutional
1 Introduction
Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness has at once been highly influential
and highly controversial. Shortly after the republication in of their work in 1987,
Coupland et al. (1988: 255) recognized its value, saying “It is surely one of the
great strengths of Brown and Levinson’s analysis that they chart the realization
of communicative strategies as precise lexical/structural selections in various
languages.” However, within the last decade or so, Brown and Levinson’s
model has become discredited. Indeed, as Mills (2011) points out, much recent
theorizing about politeness has been developed as a reaction to Brown and
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Levinson’s model, which is seen as ethnocentric and based on out-moded con-
cepts of pragmatic communication (see Eelen 2001; Watts 2003). For some
scholars, then, there is a reluctance to adopt Brown and Levinson’s ideas in
their treatment of politeness (for example, Locher and Watts 2005; Mullany
2006; Bom and Mills 2015). Instead, these post-modern analyses of interactions
prefer to rely on participants’ evaluations of politeness and do not attempt to
explain why certain linguistic choices are made in certain situations. Rather,
as is argued in Grainger (2013), the analyses consist of a description of partici-
pants’ evaluations of interactional behaviour based on supposed norms. This
in itself is a useful exercise but as Haugh (2007), Terkourafi (2005) and Mullany
(2005) have all pointed out, it has the disadvantage of fusing the perspective
of the analyst with that of participants.
On the other hand, some scholars argue that there are aspects of Brown
and Levinson’s model that can still provide analysts with a robust armoury of
technical terms and concepts with which to analyze what Goffman ([1983] 1997)
calls “the mechanics of encounters” (1997: 172). Harris, (2003) argues that
Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory has an important contribution to make
to the analysis of institutional (including courtroom) data, while O’Driscoll
(2007) argues for an adaptation of Brown and Levinson’s work that can be
usefully applied to interaction across cultures. Similarly, Holmes et al. (2012)
find concepts from Brown and Levinson to be useful in analysis of workplace
interaction. In this paper, I argue that Brown and Levinson’s model can help
to explain the ongoing management of relationships by and between partici-
pants in an institutional context such as a courtroom. In this setting, the negoti-
ation of meaning is especially crucial for outcomes of the encounter. As Harris
(2011) points out, serious, and sometimes life-changing, decisions can be pro-
foundly affected by the interaction between participants. In my view, a discur-
sive politeness treatment that only recovers whether participants are defining
the situation as “polite” is somewhat limited. What I endeavour to do here with
the Soto data is to analyze the points in the interaction where (im)politeness
strategies (based on an elaborated version of Brown and Levinson’s model) are
engaged as part of a discursive struggle for the definition of the situation and of
participant roles and relationships within that situation. The focus of analysis
is not so much how Penelope Soto and the Judge Rodriguez-Chomat internally
evaluate each other’s behaviour, but what linguistic resources they draw on to
construct and define the situation, and importantly to negotiate their way
through their interaction with each other. I will show in my analysis below how
an adaptation of Brown and Levinson’s model can do this provided politeness
strategies are not regarded as ‘containing’ predetermined meaning but rather
obtain their meaning from various aspects of the context. First, I will discuss
the concept of a neo Brown and Levinson approach.
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2 A neo-Brown and Levinson approach
As I have suggested above, even those scholars who continue to apply Brown
and Levinson’s theory of politeness do not do so uncritically and without adap-
tation. It is generally agreed that two of the main weaknesses of the Brown and
Levinson model are (1) their treatment of context and (2) their view of communi-
cation as static. In terms of context, as with traditional Gricean pragmatics,
Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) use isolated speech acts as examples, and the
role of local linguistic context or of the wider social context appears to be limit-
ed. Although there is some acknowledgement that meaning is constructed
across whole utterances (see Brown and Levinson [1987: 22]) there is a tendency
to assume that meaning inheres within the speech act itself. This implies that
the role of context in meaning-making is minimal. However, they do recognize
that context is relevant to the extent that the relational factors of power and
distance have a bearing on the politeness strategy selected. Similarly, the “rank-
ing of imposition” of the face threatening act, which it is recognized will differ
according to the cultural and situational context (Brown and Levinson 1987: 77),
is also considered to be one of the factors influencing politeness strategies.
These, however, are seen to be background “variables” (Brown and Levinson
1987: 74) of the interaction. The effect of these variables can be “computed”
via a formula (Brown and Levinson 1987: 76) and the speaker must assess the
weightiness of a face-threatening act as part of their politeness strategy. Thus,
in any one encounter, politeness strategies are predicted and determined in
what appears to be a rather mechanistic way. As Coupland et al. (1988: 258)
point out, “although Brown and Levinson’s interest in strategic face-manage-
ment is clearly and intrinsically dynamic … they are also intent on tracing strate-
gy selections back to apparently preordained configurations of social roles.”
Thus, while power, distance and “rank of imposition” (P, D and R) have some
explanatory value in accounting for the degree and quality of face-threat in any
particular circumstance (as I will show in the analysis that follows), a neo-
Brown and Levinson approach needs to also recognize that social roles are de-
fined and negotiated as the interaction unfolds. This is the approach taken in
the work of Holmes et al. (2012) in their study of New Zealand workplace interac-
tion. Similar to the analysis in this paper, they adopt what they call a “neo-
Politeness” approach, which “combines some of the insights and concepts from
Brown and Levinson with insights from social constructionism to provide a more
dynamic, context sensitive and discourse-oriented framework …” (Holmes et al.
2012: 1064).
In previous analyses of politeness in institutional contexts, I have also
made use of some of the concepts from traditional pragmatics that Brown and
Brought to you by | Sheffield Hallam University
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/23/18 12:51 PM
DE GRUYTER MOUTON22 Karen Grainger
Levinson refer to. In Grainger (2011), it is argued that the notions of speech acts
(Austin 1962), uptake (Austin 1962) and implicatures (Grice 1975) can be useful
in explaining how participants make meaning in interaction. When analyzing
talk-in-interaction, speech acts are more useful entities than words, sentences,
or even utterances, since they recognize that language use is a social practice.
In addition, Austin’s notion of “uptake” recognizes the role of the hearer and
that meaning comes in part from how a speech act is responded to. Grice’s
notion of implicature observes that meaning comes from what is not said, as
well as what is said, specifically by flouting the maxims of the cooperative
principle.
In addition, what is needed is a treatment of conversation as both sequential
and embedded in overlapping layers of context. Brown and Levinson’s focus on
the attributes of the individual speaker and hearer ignores the fact that speakers
and hearers are also members of groups and institutions, and that face consid-
erations will pertain to these entities as well as, or sometimes in preference to,
the individual identity of participants. When discussing Brown and Levinson’s
work in relation to institutional talk, Coupland et al. (1988: 260) point out that
“… the interpersonal triggers/consequences Brown and Levinson consider, while
by no means irrelevant, are likely to be of less significance than the occupation-
al and institutional role participants are necessarily inhabiting …”.
So, a neo-Brown and Levinson approach needs to be appreciative of layers
of context: linguistic context in terms of pre-contexts and next moves, as well
as socio-cultural context in terms of the layers of identities, roles and relation-
ships that may be at play in any one encounter. This is in keeping with what
has been called the third wave of interactional approaches to politeness studies
(Culpeper 2011; Grainger 2011). This approach is interested in (1) how meaning
is negotiated and constructed in the social space between interlocutors and (2)
how each turn is part of the context for the next turn. This approach also
overlaps with the notion of indexicality (see Christie, this issue) which Ochs
(1992) uses as an alternative to the view that particular linguistic forms were
characteristic of a particular gender; she instead proposed that speakers make
use of these forms in an active and constructive way. In other words, linguistic
forms are a resource that speakers may draw on to index various meanings.
Overall this is fundamentally a constructivist orientation, allied to the “interac-
tional achievement” approach taken by Arundale (2009) and the ethnomethod-
ological approach argued for by Haugh (2007) and Bargiela-Chiappini (2009).
These approaches avoid descriptions of speaker intention and prefer to focus
on what interactional resources participants themselves make relevant in talk
in the process of negotiating the encounter.
As well as analyzing the structure and sequencing of turns in an interac-
tion, naturally occurring institutional dialogue, such as in a courtroom, can
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also benefit from an analysis that provides an explanation of the “detailed and
specific linguistic mechanisms” (Holtgraves 2009: 194) that motivate the use of
certain forms of language (in preference to others). The notion of “face” is
widely recognized by politeness scholars to have such explanatory value but
many also argue that Brown and Levinson’s treatment needs to be extended
beyond seeing politeness only as a response to potential face threats (see
Haugh 2009 for a discussion). Many prefer to talk in terms of face “work” and
would do away with the notions of negative and positive face (for example,
Locher and Watts 2005; Spencer-Oatey 2009). However, I would agree with
O’Driscoll (2007: 486) who argues that “The positive-negative face(work) spec-
trum … is a culture-neutral, empirical tool for examining interaction ‘on the
ground’ with pan-cultural applicability”. Thus, a neo-Brown and Levinson ap-
proach to interaction can still usefully make use of the ideas of bald-on-record
speech acts, positive and negative face needs (and sometimes face threat), as
well as negative and positive politeness, while recognizing that facework strate-
gies may be operating within a hierarchy of roles (individual, institutional,
societal etc.) and that roles are negotiated as part of a dynamic process of
communication.
3 The courtroom context
Having said that several layers of context are applicable to the analysis, I want
to first establish those contextual factors that are likely to have an influence on
the construction of the situation. While context is to a large extent a dynamic
construction that is established and re-established by participants as the inter-
action unfolds, it is also the case that participants bring pre-existing knowledge
of the context to the situation even before they start interacting. Such pre-
existing knowledge includes expectations of norms of behaviour that have been
established through repeated use in that particular situation (Terkourafi 2005).
Such norms are particularly strong in institutions, having been put in place by
the more powerful participants (Thornborrow 2002). Thus, the facility to negoti-
ate roles and relationships in institutional contexts is much less than in “ordi-
nary” conversation. In the case of a courtroom, the judge is considered to be
the most powerful participant: the physical environment tends to be considered
his/her territory; s/he has more speaking rights than anyone else and can legiti-
mately exert his/her will over anyone else in the court (although, even the
judge has to adhere to certain rules). Other courtroom officials, such as the
clerk and the lawyers, also have a certain amount of given institutional power,
being allowed to speak within certain parameters. It is the defendant who has
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the least amount of power and whose interactional rights are most constrained.
Overall, the setting is considered to be serious and formal and expectations
about language use are in keeping with this formality. In addition to these
institutional factors, there are also likely to be wider socio-cultural influences
at play in this situation. As Harris (2011: 87) observes, “… cultural and social
‘politeness norms’ interact with the power oriented, hierarchical and prescrip-
tive interactional roles of the major participants in a criminal trial …”. In the
particular case considered here, Ms. Soto and Judge Rodriguez-Chomat are both
from a broadly Hispanic background, which is a potential source of solidarity
for them. On the other hand, this could also be a cause for divergent behaviour
if they perceive one another to be from different sections of the Hispanic com-
munity. I will discuss in the analysis below how this aspect of cultural context
becomes relevant in the interaction in terms of the politeness strategies de-
ployed (see also Christie, this issue).
It is important to remember that all of these norms and expectations are in
no way deterministic. Penelope Soto and the presiding judge negotiate their
interaction with one another against this backdrop of power and solidarity, but
they also deviate from it and manipulate it for their own interactional ends. In
fact it is probably true to say that the reason why the YouTube film clip, on
which this collection of papers is based, became well-known and caused so
much comment (see Davies, this issue) is precisely because of the tension be-
tween the macro socio-cultural context and the local interactional context. That
is to say, what people normally expect of such an encounter and what actually
happened, are at odds with each other. When Soto is found in contempt of
court, this is the culmination of a series of struggles over the definition of the
situation; these struggles are broadly speaking the struggle between institution-
al norms and the local negotiation of the relationship between the judge and
Penelope Soto. The following analysis looks at exactly how this unfolds. What
I will be concentrating on is how Soto and the judge seek to define the situa-
tion, though their communicative behaviours, in ways that become problem-
atic, particularly for the less powerful participant.
4 The construction of courtroom formality
At the start of the hearing (up to around line 50 of the transcript), we can see
how the behaviour of the judge and the court officials both reflects and con-
structs the situation as one where formality and social distance are appropriate.
The language and non-verbal behaviour is largely professional and business-
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like, consisting of bald-on-record statements and requests for information (e.g.,
line 7 “you’re being charged in possession of Xanax”), as well as professional
jargon (e.g., “I understand you’re eligible for (pre-trial) service?”, “she has no
priors”). The utterance, “Penelope Soto” at line 3 is in the conversational posi-
tion of a greeting but there is no greeting token. The judge addresses the defen-
dant with her full name and no title, and this suggests a bald-on-record name
check that is more akin to the “summons” (Schegloff 1972) of a telephone call,
than to the first part of a greeting. Soto’s uptake accords with this, since she
responds to it with “yes”, rather than a return greeting.
Extract 1 (lines 1–8)1
1. j: [((gaze right))
2. d: [((steps forward to podium))
3. j: ((gaze shift to left then to paperwork))
4. j: °pene°[lope so:to=
5. d: [yes
6. d: ((L hand under chin))
7. j: =you’re being charged in [possession of xa: nax=
8. j: ((pushes glasses. Gaze down))
Following the initial establishment of the charge, exhibited in extract 1 above,
the court officials seek to establish whether Soto is eligible for financial support
with the hearing (“pre-trial services”). Again, attention to face needs in these
turns is largely absent, apart from the formal address term ‘Miss Soto’ (see
transcript in Special Issue introduction, line 35), conveying a formal and busi-
ness-like approach to the encounter.
So far, then, in terms of the verbal interaction, this encounter is largely
consistent with institutional expectations, where the speakers are in a formal,
distant and unequal relationship. In terms of her verbal responses, the defen-
dant is cooperating, in the Gricean sense, with relevant and sufficient informa-
tion. For example, she matches the court official’s question about approximate
earnings (line 39: “how much money you make in a week approximately?”)
with “approximately about two hundred bucks a week” (line 42).
However, notice that, despite the overall formality, even at this early stage
in the proceedings, there is a suggestion of a more informal construction of the
situation, which hints at the discursive struggle to come:
1 For transcription conventions please see the full transcription in the introduction to this
issue.
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Extract 2 (lines 10–21)
10. j: =a: B A R S ((lifts hand)) >I don’t know what that
11. is<=>[what is it<
12. d: ((begins smile))
13. m: [°ba[rs°.
14. f: [bars.
15. m: ↑xanax. (.) xanax bars.
16. j: °okay°
17. j: ((gaze forward, begins smile))
18. d: ((smile heightens))
19. m: °it’s how they refer to them°=
20. j: =xanax bars.
21. j: ((returns gaze to paperwork))
At line 12, Soto begins to smile. This comes at the point where the judge ex-
presses his ignorance of the terminology related to the drug Xanax, and so it
could be interpreted as amusement at his ignorance. Of course, Brown and
Levinson’s account of politeness does not focus very much on such non-verbal
communication, although they do claim that “many aspects of non-linguistic
communicative behaviour can be naturally accommodated in the same
scheme” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 92). Extending their model to include smil-
ing, then, Soto’s initial smile could be seen as a threat to the judge’s positive
face (a negative evaluation of his state of knowledge) but the judge does not
appear to take this up as offensive. Rather, at line 16 the judge also begins to
smile, which, given his power over the situation, suggests he is allowing room
for levity in the interaction and that, in Brown and Levinson’s terms, he is
presupposing familiarity (Brown and Levinson 1987: 123) or giving a “gift” to
his addressee of sympathy and cooperation (Brown and Levinson 1987: 129). It
is difficult to say what specific “threat” this strategy may be in response to, but
more generally it is an orientation to Soto’s positive face needs and she matches
his move with a heightened smile at line 18. As the two interactants are smiling
at the same time, it would appear that Soto and the judge are collaborating
in defining the situation as one where a small degree of light-heartedness is
permissible. At this stage, there is no sign that the interaction is inappropriate,
however, it seems to point towards the discursive struggle that unravels as the
interaction continues.
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5 Discursive struggle: Club or court?
Parent or judge? Power or solidarity?
Following the business-like start that more or less conforms to the norms of
the situation, the phase of the encounter that seeks to establish whether Soto
can afford her own legal fees is where we see the first sign of tension over the
definition of the situation. In the extract below, Soto’s response to m2’s ques-
tioning is deemed to be inadequate, since the judge intervenes and rephrases
the same question. In the analysis that follows I explain the discursive struggle
in terms of Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory and Grice’s theory of impli-
cature, taking into account both the local conversational context and the macro
institutional one.
Extract 3 (lines 50 to 88)
50. m: >what do you< ↑o:wn.
51. j: ((gaze shift from paperwork to left))
52. (0.4)
53. d: aha I own a lot of ↑jewellery, alright?
54. d: ((tilting head from side to side))
55. d: .hhh[as we:ll a::s=
56. m: [°oki°
57. j: ((gaze to left, sits back in chair))
58. (0.4)
59. m: o
60. (0.6)
61. m: go ah[ead ]
62. d: [a car]?
63. (0.4)
64. j: well[ho- how much] how m- how ha how much e would=
65. d: [a::n ]
66. j: ((moves both hands))
67. j: =you say your jew:ellery’s wo:rth.
68. (0.6)
69. d: ahehehe he a he[hehe
70. j: [ai: it’s not a joke=you know? we are
71. not in a- we are not in a club no: : w=
72. j: ((smile))
73. d: =o?kay. but it’s e[you know kind if you know but=
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74. d: ((begins to stroke hair, gaze toward camera))
75. j: [aha you see that we are not in=
76. d: = it’s you know
77. j: =a we are not in a club.= be se:rious about it.=
78. j: ((sits forward, opens arms, hands up, gaze left))
((brings hands together and apart))
79. d: =I am se?rious about it.[but it you just made me=
80. j: [>oh you’re< being very
81. s: =
82. d: =la: .ugh ] ((stops stroking hair))
83. j: =I can see] you’re ↑serious. alright.
84. j: ((gaze shifts from left to paperwork))
85. (0.5)
86. d: >↑you jez< made me, laugh.=↑I apologiz?e=
87. d: ((left hand on chest, right hand moves off to left,
palm up, stroking hair))
88. j: =ts alright.=e how much is you’re jew:ellery worth.
At line 50, the court official m, asks the bald-on-record question “What do you
own” which is potentially threatening to Soto’s negative face within a Brown
and Levinsonian definition of negative face (Brown and Levinson 1987: 62).
According to Brown and Levinson (1987: 95), the absence of politeness strate-
gies can be for the sake of “maximum efficiency” and although they do not
mention institutional contexts as ones where efficiency overrides face needs, I
would argue that this is perhaps one reason why non-mitigation of face-threat
is appropriate within the context of a courtroom. Furthermore, in this context,
the “absolute ranking” of the imposition (Brown and Levinson 1987: 74) con-
tained in the question is actually quite low given that the addressee (Soto) is
in a relatively powerless position. In other words, face concerns are back-
grounded in favour of the institutional goal of obtaining the required informa-
tion. However, Soto’s response to this does not take up this matter-of-fact tone,
instead she orients to this as a face concern, flouting Grice’s maxim of quantity.
She gives a vague answer to an intrusive question: “I own a lot of jewellery
alright?” (line 53). It is also accompanied by laughter, which often accompanies
face-threatening talk or occurs at moments of ambiguity and tension (Holmes
2000, Adelswärd 1989). At this point the judge’s intervention (lines 64–67), in
the form of a re-phrasing of the question, confirms that Soto’s first answer is
not considered adequate. Notice that his question is now mitigated with “well”
and the use of the modal verb in the question, “how much would you say your
jewellery’s worth?”, matching the orientation to face concerns that Soto has
exhibited.
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At this point Soto laughs (line 69) and it is this that the judge is responding
to when he says “it’s not a joke”, thus defining her response as inappropriate,
which is a threat to her positive face needs. He then explicitly challenges what
he takes to be her definition of the situation as a non-serious one. This is the
conversational move of someone in a powerful position since he takes it upon
himself to tell her how she should be interpreting the encounter. And yet there
is still ambiguity within his response: he is still smiling suggesting that he is
non-verbally paying attention to her positive face needs. Arguably, then, he is
giving out mixed messages. His approach at this point has similarities to that
of a parent to a child – authoritative but familiar at the same time. Indeed,
Soto orients to the familiarity in his approach when she says “you just made
me laugh” (lines 79–82). Accusing someone of making you laugh could be seen
as positive politeness in many interpersonal contexts. However, in a courtroom,
telling the judge that he made you laugh arguably threatens his institutional
positive face; his role is to maintain order and authority in an institutional
setting that deals with essentially serious matters. In this context, then, Soto’s
move can be seen as inappropriate since the definition of the whole situation
as serious is put in jeopardy. This is one example of the ways in which socio-
cultural norms interact with institutional, power-oriented norms (Harris 2011).
Soto’s next move is a performative apology, “I apologise”, which is an ac-
knowledgement of a breach of norms in the interaction and an attempt to re-
store situational and interactional equilibrium. In Brown and Levinson’s terms,
this act is a threat to her own positive face since it is an admission of fault
(expression of regret for a prior face-threatening act). The judge accepts her
apology in a fairly informal way at line 88 (“ts alright”), but when the question
of how much her jewellery is worth is asked again with a bald-on-record ques-
tion (albeit accompanied by smiling), Soto continues to define the situation as
one in which social distance is reduced, as we can see in Extract 4:
Extract 4 (lines 91–113)
91. d: it’s. worth? a lot. of moni:.=
92. d: ((starts stroking hair with right hand))
93. j: =like what.
94. (0.2)
95. d: like:. (0.5) rick? ro::ss.=
96. d: ((moves head to both sides))
97. j: =↑ah??
98. j: ((gaze left, eyebrows raise))
99. (3.1)
100. d: ((swallows, left hand to throat, choking like
action, continues stroking hair, opens mouth))
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101. o: °hohoho°
102. x: [°oh. °
103. d: [↑it’s wo:rth?=
104. j: =mam?=
105. d: =mo:ney.
106. d: ((nods, begins stroking hair with both hands))
107. j: have you had any kind of drugs in the=
108. j: ((rolls hands in front of body, gaze left, shakes
head))
109. j: in the last 24 hou:rs?
110. d: ((tips body backward, steps backward and to right
and back to camera, eyes open wide, gaze shift from
up to left to down to forward))
111. d: ↑a:ctually↑ (0.3) no::.
112. d: ((stroking hair))
113. j: actually no::?
Here, Soto again gives a vague answer to the question of what her jewellery is
worth (line 91, “it’s worth a lot of money”), and when asked to specify (“like
what”, line 93) she responds with what she may suppose draws on common
knowledge that Rick Ross’ jewellery is worth a lot of money (line 95). While
this answer is relevant, it gives unclear or ambiguous information (flouting
Grice’s maxim of manner) and arguably gives too much information (flouting
quantity) given the situation she is in. In other words, in a situation where she
may be eligible for financial help, it is not in her own interests to declare that
she owns valuable jewellery, since this may result in help being denied. How-
ever, Soto appears to orient to a different kind of situation: one where her
positive face would be enhanced by declaring that she has expensive jewellery.
That is to say, she appears to be trying to impress her addressee and/or her
audience with her wealth. This is completely at odds with the institutional
norms of the situation. Hence we find that the judge’s next turn (lines 104–7),
“Mam have you had any kind of drugs?” flouts Grice’s maxim of relation, the
possible implicature being that Soto’s previous turn is defined as inappropriate
and the reason for this behaviour may be that she has taken drugs. There is a
threat to Soto’s positive face contained in this implicature, however the judge’s
use of the respectful address term “Mam” as well as the vagueness of “any
drugs” seems to pay more attention to her negative face, arguably with the
institutional goal of returning the tone of the interaction to a more formal and
professional one. Soto responds to the implicature that she may have taken
drugs with “actually no” which is followed by the judge’s checking move “actu-
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ally no?” (line 113), suggesting that there is something surprising or doubtful
about her answer. Once again, then, the judge asserts his power by taking an
evaluative stance towards her contribution. Evaluating moves in the third turn
position of an exchange have been found to be typical of asymmetrical institu-
tional interactions (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975; Thornborrow 2002). However,
the definition of the situation remains ambiguous, not least because his body
language continues to reflect amusement (see lines 117, 118, 125) and yet his
verbal moves are those of a powerful participant, as we see in Extract 5:
Extract 5 (lines 116–140)
116. d: ((smiling, gaze forward))
117. j: [hhehe[he
118. j: ((smiling widely, gaze forward, manipulating
something with hands))
119. d: ((tips body forward, smiling, gaze forward)) ((court
official walks through jailhouse behind defendant
from right to front right, gaze of woman in the back
follows the court official))
120. m: [>I’ll accept< appoint.ment at this
121. t[ime
122. j: [no. no=I >ain’t going to< appoint? you. because
123. you’re also not on my- substantial amounts of
124. jewel.lery.
125. j: ((opens arms wide, smiling, gaze forward, smiling))
126. d: ((smiling, begins to stroke hair on other side of head
with both hands, steps backward))
127. x: ((individual walks from right to left in court room
footage))
128. j: you can go and sell your jew:ellery.
129. j: ((gaze left, left hand raises toward left))
130. d: ((left hand raises to in front of mouth))
131. (1.0)
132. j: je:well::ery for a (0.6) private, attorney.=
133. j: ((raises left hand, gaze to paperwork to left to
paperwork))
134. x: ((moves through courtroom camera from bottom to
right))
135. d: ((gaze left to forward, stroking hair with left hand,
stroking stops, hand rests in front of mouth))
136. j: =what is the standard bond?
Brought to you by | Sheffield Hallam University
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/23/18 12:51 PM
DE GRUYTER MOUTON32 Karen Grainger
137. j: ((moves right hand)) ((gaze moves from left to
right))
138. (0.4)
139. f: it sh?↑ould be: =
140. j: =ain’t >gonna< be no P.T.S.=
Following his suggestion that Soto might be on drugs, the judge’s verbal contri-
butions are bald-on-record, and threatening to the face needs of both the law-
yers/court officials in attendance (line 122, “ain’t going to appoint you”) and
Soto, (line 128, “you can go and sell your jewellery”; line 140, “ain’t gonna be
no PTS2”). Thus, it appears that the interactional consequences of Soto not
conforming to the behavioural conventions of the courtroom are that the judge
invokes his institutional role and reaffirms his institutional power through face-
threatening acts and the absence of politeness. The practical upshot of Soto’s
failure to respond appropriately (as defined by the judge) is that Soto will be
forced to pay her own legal expenses. However, as we will see below, from
that point there is continued ambiguity and struggle over the definition of the
situation, which results in even more serious consequences for Ms. Soto. The
next extract follows on from the point where the judge has set bail (at the
“standard” rate of $5000) and then considers that the interaction is over:
Extract 6 (lines 166–195)
166. j: bye? bye,
167. j: ((right hand makes waving gesture to left, gaze left,
frowning expression))
168. (1.1)
169. d: adi:?o:s.
170. d: ((leans forward, gaze forward, smiling))
171. o: °erhh.°
172. d: ((walks away from camera off left))
173. j: ((begins smile, gaze left))
174. j: °hehehehe° COME BACK MAM.
175. j: COME back,
176. j: ((right hand making summoning gesture))
177. x: ((incoherent talk))
178. (1.6)
179. j: com?e ba:ck,
180. j: ((summoning gesture, gaze shift to left))
2 I assume this stands for ‘Pre-trial services’ and refers to some kind of financial aid.
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181. d: ((smiling, walks back to camera, clasps hands
together))
182. (0.5)
183. j: >gimme the< paper again.
184. j: ((left hand moves off screen, gaze left, smile))
185. d: ((puts hands to mouth, gaze right to forward, hands
cross across chest, gaze and body orientation move to
back left))
186. (5.7)
187. j: count one, will be. ten, thou,sand.
188. j: ((gaze left, right hand gestures left))
189. d: ((immediately opens mouth)) ((grabs hair, tips body
forward))
190. (0.2)
191. d: [.hhh]
192. x: [oooo]oooh.
193. j: ((writing on paperwork, no smile))
194. d: are you ↑ser[ious?
195. j: [I am serious.= a↑dio::s?
The judge dismisses Soto with a wave of his hand and the informal, even child-
like “bye-bye”, once again drawing on the parent-child discourse that we saw
earlier. Although Brown and Levinson do not specifically comment on leave-
taking speech acts, it seems reasonable to assume that leave-taking would be
seen as intrinsically threatening to positive face since it conveys a desire to
cease communion with the hearer. However, this view of speech acts is limiting
since it is only when we examine the speech acts in context that we can see
which face needs are threatened. In this context, the judge is in a position of
institutional power (combined, arguably with the additional status that goes
with being a generation older than Soto) and so he has greater entitlement than
does Soto to manipulate the formality of the situation through his verbal and
non-verbal behaviour. The judge’s utterance can be seen as simultaneously and
ambiguously a directive (that Soto should leave) and a farewell; the interaction-
al threats are to both negative and positive face. The informality of “bye bye”
has connotations of a simplified register that reduces the authority and formali-
ty of the speaker and thus orients to both the face threats involved in his speech
act.
In conversation analytic terms, then, “bye bye” is not necessarily the first
part of a leave-taking adjacency pair and, could equally be taken up as a com-
mand. As such, the next appropriate move would be for Soto to simply absent
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herself. However, Soto once again picks up on the informality and solidarity
implied in the judge’s usage and responds to his dismissal as if it were the first
pair part of a leave-taking, with the “adios” (line 169). This possibly alludes to
their perceived common ethnicity (being Hispanic) and so is arguably an at-
tempt at positive politeness. However, “adios” is also a conventional expression
of farewell among non-Hispanics and is often used playfully or even sarcastical-
ly. Soto’s body language (leaning forward and smiling) and marked prosody in
pronouncing the word would also suggest she is not being serious.
As with the previous exchanges up to this point, the judge defines Soto’s
contribution to the interaction as inappropriate, despite it being a matching of
the informality in his own language. This adverse reaction may be because it
draws attention to the common ground between them, in a situation set up to
put distance between defendants and judges, but it could simply be a reaction
to the face-threat involved in the perceived sarcasm in Soto’s “adios”. As be-
fore, the judge’s language returns to the formal address and the bald-on-record
commands of a powerful participant. In effect, he rejects her parting shot by
not allowing her to leave (“come back mam”, line 174). After what could be
seen as a build-up of unconventional exchanges between them, this is the point
where things go seriously wrong for Soto as the judge doubles the bond (line
187). In yet another counter-normative move (but one which is not unlike that
of a teenage child to a parent, in that it assumes closeness), Soto expresses
shock at his ruling with the challenge, “are you serious?” (line 194), to which
the judge responds “I am serious” (line 195) and dismisses her with a mimick-
ing/matching of the very word that he did not like, “adios” (line 195). This
action draws attention to the fact that, although Soto may attempt to define
the relationship between them as one which is more or less solidary, this, in
fact, does not impact on his institutional power. Soto continues to define the
situation as informal but this time attacks the judge’s positive face rather than
orienting to it. She seems to completely disregard any conventional definition
of the situation as formal or power-laden and in fact assumes the position of a
powerful participant by swearing at him.
Extract 7 (lines 204–205)
204. d: ((begins to walk away, gaze unknown, ‘flips the bird’
with left hand, gaze back to camera,
205. d: °fuck you°
Here, once again, an elaboration of Brown and Levinson’s account of politeness
is needed. As Locher and Watts (2005), Bousfield (2008), Culpeper (1996) and
others have observed, Brown and Levinson’s theory does not deal with deliber-
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ate face attack. Far from mitigating potential face-threats, and enhancing the
judge’s face, Soto apparently seeks to directly damage the judge’s positive face.
Arguably, though, her behaviour is still is based on an assumption of familiari-
ty, rather than respectful distance, just as between a parent and teenage child.
But in a courtroom context, the judge’s interactional power is severely chal-
lenged and his decision to hold her in contempt of court reasserts his institu-
tional power.
Thus, Soto’s turns at talk have gone from assuming a common ground
between them (albeit inappropriately), in Brown and Levinson’s terms, orient-
ing to positive face needs, to threatening the judge’s positive face needs by
challenging his decision and ultimately attacking his face by swearing at him.
In all cases, her behaviour is constructed as over-familiar by the judge, who
then invokes his institutional powers and privileges to restore his status. Al-
though the media and the watching public in the US were shocked by the use
of a taboo word and gesture towards a very high status addressee (see Davies,
this issue and Christie, this issue), on close analysis of the whole interaction,
it appears that it is the use of the word “adios”, which the judge takes up as a
face-threat, that turned this from a run-of-the-mill bail hearing for a minor
crime, to a YouTube phenomenon. It was at the point of the uttering of this
word that the defendant was asked to return to face the judge and that her
bond was doubled. Indeed, the significance of this speech act is confirmed by
the reaction of unidentified members of the court (labelled x in the transcript)
who express amusement and shock at the use of the word “adios” (see lines
201–203). So, while “adios” is not rude and face attacking in the same way as
“flipping the bird”, and in some cases could even be perceived as positively
polite and face enhancing, in the context of a court hearing, it is apparently so
inappropriate as to threaten the judge’s institutional face, which he redresses
by simply asserting his powerful position.
6 Conclusion
In this neo-Brown and Levinson analysis of courtroom data, concepts from
Gricean pragmatics and from Brown and Levinson’s model of politeness have
been drawn on, in what is nevertheless a constructivist orientation to the dis-
course. By engaging the notions of implicature from Grice (1975) and uptake
from Austin (1962), I have shown how the participants’ meanings are construct-
ed and defined as appropriate or inappropriate, as solidary or powerful, in the
on-going discourse. Similarly, I have shown how, if the concepts of positive
and negative face are applied beyond just face-threatening acts, they can be
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useful in analyzing how Penelope Soto and judge Rodriguez-Chomat negotiate
their relationships with one another and define their roles in relation to each
other. That is to say, while roles are very much pre-set in this formal institution-
al context, the precise definition and management of roles and relationships is
nevertheless negotiated dynamically as the interaction progresses. In this case,
the situation is variously and, ambiguously, defined by participants as at once
institutional and personal, informal and serious, power-laden and solidary.
However, in this negotiation, the participants are not on equal ground and we
can see that the judge defines the situation through his verbal and non-verbal
moves, drawing on his assumed institutional power. This ambiguity is perhaps
misjudged by Soto who orients to a more informal interpretation of the situa-
tion (perhaps that of a parent and child) and it is this struggle over the defini-
tion of the situation that ultimately gets her into trouble. Whiles she may
attempt to exert interactional definition and power, ultimately she is institu-
tionally powerless.
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